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Abstract
Canadian decision makers refer so regularly to the bi-
partite nature of the test for persecution in refugee
claims that one rarely gives the matter a second
thought. After all, the Supreme Court of Canada in
Ward clearly affirmed that a refugee claimant must
subjectively fear persecution, and this fear must be well-
founded in an objective sense.
In this article, the authors focus on the meaning
and validity of the subjective aspect of the bipartite test.
It is especially appropriate to do so at this time, given
the introduction of the term “person in need of protec-
tion” in section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Pro-
tection Act, and recent Federal Court decisions holding
that the subjective fear is not a requirement in section
97 cases.
Looking at the issue of subjective fear from histori-
cal, psychological, and legal perspectives, the authors ar-
gue: (a) that the drafters of the UN Convention never
intended claimants to be “subjectively afraid” in order
to qualify for protection; (b) determining an asylum
seeker’s state of mind presents a minefield of potential
problems for decision makers; and (c) given the new
IRPA provisions dealing with persons in need of protec-
tion, the question is not whether there is a bipartite test
for determining well-founded fear, but whether, indeed,
there ought to be such a test.
Résumé
Les décisionnaires Canadiens font si souvent allusion au
caractère bipartite du test de la persécution dans les cas
de revendications du statut de réfugié que l’on ne s’arrête
presque jamais pour reconsidérer la chose. Après tout,
n’est-il pas vrai que la Cour suprême du Canada a affir-
mé très clairement, dans le cas de Ward, qu’un revendica-
teur doit avoir une crainte subjective de la persécution, et
que cette crainte doit être bien-fondée de façon objective?
Dans cet article, les auteurs se penchent sur le sens à
donner à l’aspect subjectif du test bipartite et à sa validi-
té. Il est tout spécialement pertinent de poser ces ques-
tions dans les circonstances présentes, étant donné que le
terme « personne à protéger » a été inclus à l’article 97 de
la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, et
au vu des décisions récentes de la Cour fédérale déclarant
que la peur subjective n’est pas une condition requise
dans les cas visés par l’article 97.
Examinant la question de la peur subjective du point
de vue historique, psychologique et légal, les auteurs sou-
tiennent que : (a) les auteurs de la Convention des Na-
tions Unies n’avaient jamais voulu dire que les
revendicateurs devaient « avoir une crainte subjective »
pour être qualifiés pour la protection ; (b) essayer de dé-
terminer l’état d’esprit d’un demandeur du droit d’asile
est un exercice truffé d’embûches pour les décisionnaires ;
et (c) vu les dispositions récentes de la LIPR concernant
les personnes ayant un besoin de protection, la vraie ques-
tion n’est pas de savoir s’il existe un test bipartite pour
déterminer la peur bien-fondée, mais plutôt si un tel test
doit exister.
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Introduction
I
n a recent decision, the Refugee Protection Division
(RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB)
accepted that a young, female claimant from Estonia had
been the victim of trafficking.1 She had been tricked into
going to Italy where she thought she would find work as a
domestic. Instead, her testimony was that upon arrival in
Italy, she was taken and held against her will by a group of
men involved in organized criminal activity. The RPD ac-
cepted the claimant’s allegation that she was forced into
prostitution in Italy.2 It accepted “that the claimant was
greatly traumatized by this prostitution ring”.3 It also ac-
cepted that she had “clearly run afoul of a group of criminals
in Estonia,” after she escaped from her captors in Italy and
returned home.4
In a  report filed  at the  claimant’s hearing, a clinical
psychologist stated that the claimant “reported a constella-
tion of psychological and somatic symptoms that are en-
tirely consistent  with  individuals who have  experienced
severe psychological stressors, such as forced confinement,
repeated rapes, and forced prostitution.”5 According to the
psychological report, “[d]iagnostically, [this claimant]
meets all the criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder of
chronic duration (i.e., more than three months) with de-
pressed mood as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV revised)” (emphasis
in the original).6 Among the symptoms exhibited by this
claimant were: recurrent nightmares; intrusive thoughts;
significant emotional distress when exposed to stimuli that
remind her of the traumatic events; sleep difficulties; hy-
per-vigilance; irritability; interpersonal distrust; and social
isolation/withdrawal.7
As her lawyers, we had come to know this woman well
over a period of more than two years. In preparation for her
hearing, a great deal of time had been spent with her. From
our perspective, if one word (more than any other) could
be used to characterize this woman’s demeanour, it would
be “frightened.” This view was corroborated by the psy-
chologist who had examined our client. According to her,
this claimant was one of the most traumatized people she
had ever encountered in years of practice.
It was therefore surprising to read in the RPD’s decision
that the panel found this claimant to be lacking in subjective
fear. Thiswas because her failure to claim asyluminthe United
States, when she had the opportunity to do so, was found to
be behaviour inconsistent with someone who is truly afraid.
It is not uncommon, of course, for RPD panels to deter-
mine that a claimant is lacking in subjective fear. In Canada
v. Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that there
is a bipartite test for persecution: a claimant must subjec-
tively fear persecution, and this fear must be well-founded
in an objective sense.8 La Forest J., writing for the Court,
cited the oft-quoted passage of Heald J.A. in the Federal
Court of Appeal decision in Rajudeen:
The subjective component relates to the existence of the fear of
persecution in the mind of the refugee. The objective compo-
nent requires that the refugee’s fear be evaluated objectively to
determine if there is a valid basis for that fear.9
The subjective component of the bipartite test has engen-
dered both controversy and questions. Is it appropriate for
board members to delve into whether fear actually exists in
the minds of refugee claimants? If so, should the subjective
and objective components be weighted equally? Could the
lack of subjective fear negate a refugee claim, even if there
are objective reasons for the claimant to fear persecution? If
so, should it?
It is timely to consider the status of “subjective fear” in
refugee determinations in view of the addition of “consoli-
dated grounds” for protection found in the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).10 Section 97 of IRPA
introduces the term “persons in need of protection,” and
the court has already addressed whether such persons must
demonstrate a subjective fear of persecution in order to
qualify for “protected person” status.
Looking at the issue of subjective fear from historical,
psychological, and legal perspectives, we argue that: (a) the
drafters of the UN Convention never intended claimants to
be “subjectively afraid” in order to qualify for protection;
(b) determining an asylum seeker’s state of mind presents
a minefield of potential problems for decision makers; and
(c) given the new IRPA provisions dealing with persons in
need of protection, the question is not whether there is a
bipartite test for determining well-founded fear, but
whether, indeed, there ought to be.
History
One may begin by asking, “where does the notion arise that
refugee status is determined, in part, by a person’s frame of
mind?” Where does it say that a person must actually be
afraid in order to qualify as a Convention refugee? The
Convention itself stipulates that a person’s unwillingness to
avail himself of the protection of his country must be “owing
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted.”11 It does not
specify, however, whether “fear” is meant to be “[t]he emo-
tion of pain or uneasiness caused by the sense of impending
danger or by the prospect of some possible evil,” or “a
particular apprehension of some future evil,” or “an appre-
hension or dread of something that will or may happen in
the future” – all definitions found in the Oxford English
Dictionary.12
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Support for the first definition of “fear” is found in the
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refu-
gee Status, published in 1988 by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. It states, at paragraph 38:
To the element of fear – a state of mind and a subjective
condition – is added the qualification “well-founded”. This
implies that it is not only the frame of mind of the person
concerned that determines his refugee status, but that this frame
of mind must be supported by an objective situation. The term
“well-founded fear” therefore contains a subjective and an ob-
jective element, and in determining whether well-founded fear
exists, both elements must be taken into consideration.13
In his book The Law of Refugee Status, James Hathaway
argues that this two-pronged, bipartite approach to the
definition of “well-founded fear” is “neither historically
defensible nor practically meaningful.”14 According to Pro-
fessor Hathaway, “[w]ell founded fear has nothing to do
with the state of mind of the applicant for refugee status,
except insofar as  the claimant’s  testimony may provide
some evidence of the state of affairs in her home country.”15
One reason why decision makers and commentators have
found it necessary to examine the psychological reaction of
claimants to conditions in their state of origin, states Hathaway,
is the linguistic ambiguity of the word “fear.” He writes:
While the word “fear” may imply a form of emotional response,
it may also be used to signal an anticipatory appraisal of risk.
That is, a person may fear a particular event in the sense that
she apprehends that it may occur, yet she may or may not
(depending on her personality and emotional make-up) stand
in trepidation of it actually taking place. It is clear from an
examination of the drafting history of the Convention that the
term “fear” was employed to mandate a forward-looking assess-
ment of risk, not to require an examination of the emotional
reaction of the claimant.16
The predecessor to the UN Convention definition of
“refugee” can be found in the Constitution of the Interna-
tional Refugee Organization (IRO). The IRO was the first
to incorporate the word “fear” into its definition of a refu-
gee. As explained by Guy Goodwin-Gill in his text The
Refugee in International Law, the word was used not to
express an emotion, but rather a desire not to be returned
to a country where persecution was a reasonable possibility.
He writes:
[T]he IRO Constitution included as refugees those unable or
unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the govern-
ment of their country of nationality or former residence. It was
expressly recognized that individuals might have ‘valid objec-
tions’ to returning to their country of origin, including ‘perse-
cution or fear based on reasonable grounds of persecution
because of race, religion, nationality or political opinions,’ and
objections ‘of a political nature judged by the IRO to be valid’.17
Hathaway argues that the inclusion of the word “fear” in
the IRO Constitution was meant to extend protection be-
yond those who had been persecuted in the past. It allowed
for protection to be granted to those who, even though not
persecuted in the past, might still be in jeopardy in their
state of  origin because  of  who they were  or  what they
believed. “The establishment of the alternative formulation
of refugee status was thus intended to recognize the impor-
tance not only of sheltering those who had already been
persecuted, but equally of extending protection to those
who could be spared from prospective harm.”18 Concludes
the author: “The use of the term ‘fear’ was intended to
emphasize the forward-looking nature of the test, and not
to ground refugee status in an assessment of the refugee
claimant’s state of mind.”19
According to Hathaway, a claimant’s state of mind was
meant to be relevant only in exceptional cases, of persons
who had suffered past persecution, or whose “horrifying
memories made it impossible for them to consider return-
ing.”20 The example given was of a person who had fled Nazi
Germany and for psychological reasons could not return
after the war, even though, objectively, there was no longer
a risk of persecution. This exception is found in the current
legislation at subsection 108 (4).21 Where the reasons for
which persons sought refugee protection have ceased to
exist, they may still be Convention refugees or persons in
need of protection if able to establish that there are “com-
pelling reasons” arising out of previous persecution for
refusing to avail themselves of the protection of their coun-
try.22 In  all other cases,  argues  Hathaway, whether fear
actually exists in a claimant’s mind is irrelevant.
Atle Grahl-Madsen, in The Status of Refugees in Interna-
tional Law, takes a similar view of the propriety of peering
into the minds of refugee claimants. “The adjective ‘well-
founded’,” he states, “suggests that it is not the frame of
mind of the person concerned which is decisive for his
claim to refugeehood, but that this claim should be meas-
ured with a more objective yardstick.”23 According to
Grahl-Madsen:
[T]he frame of mind of the individual hardly matters at all.
Every person claiming – or being claimed (in the case of minors)
– to be a refugee has “fear” (“well-founded” or otherwise) of
being persecuted in the sense of the present provision, irrespec-
tive of whether he jitters at the very thought of his return to his
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home country, is prepared to brave all hazards, or is simply
apathetic or even unconscious of the possible dangers.24
Clearly a fearful state of mind on the part of the refugee
claimant, on its own, is not enough to satisfy the Convention
refugee definition. There must be an objective basis to that
fear. By the same token, the mere fact that human rights
violations are prevalent in an asylum-seeker’s country is
insufficient evidence to justify a positive determination. The
individual’s particular circumstances must be placed in the
context of those violations to show that he or she would be
at risk if returned there.
To Grahl-Madsen, the “subjective” aspect of the refugee
definition referred to those individual circumstances, or
characteristics, of the claimant. The problem with trying to
determine whether fear actually exists in a person’s psyche,
he states, is that
[w]e cannot find a meaningful, common denominator in the
minds of refugees. We must [therefore] seek it in the conditions
prevailing in the country whence they have fled. “Well-founded
fear of being persecuted” may therefore be said to exist, if it is
likely that the [individual] person concerned will become the
victim of persecution if he returns to his country of origin.25
Implied in the last sentence is the phrase “regardless of his
or her state of mind.”
Psychology
To determine whether a refugee claimant subjectively fears
persecution, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward ex-
plained that a decision maker must establish whether such
a fear exists “in the mind of the refugee.”26 Yet, as Goodwin-
Gill points out: “Fear, and the degree to which it is felt by a
particular individual, are incapable of precisequantification.”27
Since IRB members are not capable of actually reading a
person’s mind, the existence of subjective fear, or the lack
thereof, is determined through an examination of a claim-
ant’s actions and statements.
Typically, the Board finds that a refugee claimant lacks
subjective fear when that person’s actions do not conform
to what is perceived to be the expected behaviour of some-
one who is afraid. Board members assume, for example,
that persons who truly fear persecution will leave their
country at the earliest opportunity. They will seek asylum
in the first country where such a claim is possible, they will
not return voluntarily once having left the country where
they fear persecution, and they will ask for refugee status at
the Canadian port of entry or as soon as possible after
entering Canada. Unless they are able to provide a reason-
able explanation for their behaviour, those who act differ-
ently  are routinely  found by the Board to be lacking a
subjective fear of persecution.28
Such decisions are based on the member’s understanding
of human behaviour. They are premised on the notion that,
normally, people who are afraid will act in certain predictable
ways. This approach, however, is fraught with potential prob-
lems – especially in a refugee context.
The first concern arises from the fact that not all indi-
viduals react to fear or danger in the same way. Although it
is true, as Eve Carlson notes in her text Trauma Assessments:
A Clinician’s Guide, that “[w]hen humans are exposed to
extreme danger, they have a natural response of fear and
anxiety,”29 how the trauma that arises from fear will mani-
fest itself varies from person to person.
The clearest psychological indicators that someone has
been exposed to extreme danger are the symptoms attrib-
uted to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD is
associated with victims of the types of persecution regularly
found in refugee claims: assault; detention; kidnapping; tor-
ture (both physical and psychological); and rape and other
kinds of sexual assault. However, as Carlson points out,
...although all of the core, secondary and associated trauma
symptoms can occur as part of a post-traumatic disorder, all of
these will not necessarily occur. Different symptoms may pre-
dominate in a client’s symptom picture as a result of the influ-
ence of various individual and situational factors and the length
of time that has passed since the trauma.30
In short, people react to fear in individualized ways. As such,
predicting how a person will respond to danger or fear is at
best an extremely challenging task, particularly for those not
trained in the psychology of trauma.
Added to the complexity of assessing fear is the notion
that culture may be a factor in how a person responds to
danger. As Carlson observes:
It is possible that “particular symptoms may predominate in a
traumatized individual as a result of cultural influences. As with
all psychological disorders, we should expect culture to greatly
influence how symptoms are expressed. Although the bulk of
research and clinical reports relating to trauma responses has
focused on white, middle and upper-middle class Americans,
the research on trauma responses of persons from other cul-
tures (and U.S. subcultures) that is available indicates that there
may be considerable variation in the symptoms observed fol-
lowing trauma in different cultures.”31
This is not to say that people from different cultures have a
different internal response to trauma, only that the manifes-
tation of those symptoms may differ according to one’s
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culture. In other words, persons from different cultures may
appear, to a western observer, to respond to trauma in an
“atypical” way. This cross-cultural phenomenon ought to be
a warning sign to RPD members who are drawing conclu-
sions about subjective fear based on the behaviour of people
coming from a myriad of cultures.
One factor that may also affect the assessment of subjec-
tive fear is the claimant’s gender. Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey has
argued that the subjective fear component of the bipartite
test has a particularly negative impact on female claimants.
She notes that
[w]omen fleeing gender-related harms have often not been
successful in communicating their subjective fear of persecu-
tion even in the face of strong objective indicators because they
have difficulty relating their claims. In particular, female refu-
gee claimants are often reluctant to disclose experiences of
sexual violence to asylum decision-makers who are predomi-
nantly men, because of the stigma attached to sexual violence,
or due to trauma.32
The fact that much testimony will be relayed to the Board
via interpreters, she suggests, may result in testimony that is
either distorted, censored, or both.
One assumes that a person acting rationally would leave
a situation of risk as soon as possible. Similarly, it would be
rational for a person at risk to seek protection at the earliest
opportunity. However, even a cursory survey of psycho-
logical texts on the subject of trauma makes it clear that
people who have been traumatized do not always act ration-
ally, let alone in their own best interests. People who are
afraid, especially those who have been traumatized by
events, often act in ways that seem irrational and counter-
intuitive. This does not mean they have not been trauma-
tized or that they are not truly afraid. In fact, the very
opposite may be true.
Instead of escaping, seeking protection, or other behav-
iour that one would normally associate with a profound
fear, the traumatized person may instead become dissoci-
ated from her reality. According to numerous studies, “dis-
sociation is an integral aspect of PTSD.”33 In   her
authoritative text, Trauma and Recovery, Dr. Judith Her-
man explains:
[a person suffering from PTSD] may feel as though the event is
not happening to her, as though she is observing from outside
her body, or as though the whole experience is a bad dream from
which she will shortly awaken. These perceptual changes com-
bine with a feeling of indifference, emotional detachment, and
profound passivity in which the person relinquishes all initia-
tive and struggle.34
People caught in situations that seem inescapable may re-
spond, not by taking steps to escape, but by removing them-
selves from danger in a psychological sense only. Writes Dr.
Herman:
When a person is completely powerless, and any form of resis-
tance is futile, she may go into a state of surrender. The system
of self-defence shuts down entirely. The helpless person escapes
from her situation not by action in the real world but rather by
altering her state of consciousness.” (emphasis added)35
A state of profound passivity, in which one relinquishes
all initiative and struggle, is not one that leads to the type
of actions the IRB typically associates with a genuine sub-
jective fear. Yet these are the actions – or in-actions – of
people who are afraid. As Dr. Herman explains: “The con-
strictive symptoms of the traumatic neurosis apply not only
to thought, memory, and states of consciousness but also
to the entire field of purposeful action and initiative."36
Sometimes, trauma prevents individuals from express-
ing or proclaiming their fear, the very act that Board mem-
bers seem to believe is consistent with a “subjective fear.”
In fact, writes Bessel A. van der Kolk, “trauma may lead to
a ‘speechless terror’, which in some individuals interferes
with the ability to put feelings into words, leaving emotions
to be mutely expressed by dysfunction of the body.”37
Other psychological phenomena associated with trauma
suggest additional reasons why traumatized individuals
may not react in anticipated ways to situations of risk.
Everstine and Everstine, in their text The Trauma Response,
note that:
[s]ome victims [of trauma], particularly those who were seri-
ously injured, have no memory of the event. This may be due
to physical trauma (i.e. head injury), emotional trauma or both.
Some may eventually remember what happened to them, while
others may never experience the memory.38
It is true that in assessing subjective fear, Board members
may be aware of the complexities of trauma, or psychologi-
cal reports filed as evidence may alert them to the claimant’s
state of mind. But, as the case described in the Introduction
illustrates, a diagnosis of PTSD does not prevent conclu-
sions about subjective fear from being made based on the
assumed behaviour of persons who are afraid. Moreover,
with single-member panels, the high cost of psychologi-
cal/psychiatric reports, the scarcity of legal aid funding for
refugee claimants, and the significant incidence of claim-
ants appearing without counsel,39 there is a strong likeli-
hood that “mis-diagnoses” will be made in determining the
existence of subjective fear.
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Finally on this point, it should be noted that other mo-
tivations, apart from or in addition to fear, may also influ-
ence a claimant’s behaviour. The Federal Court has held
that negative inferences about subjective fear should not be
drawn if a refugee claimant offers a reasonable explanation
for failure to seek asylum in a transit country.40 The pres-
ence of family members in the country of destination, for
example, has been held to be a justifiable reason for failure
to  make a claim while en route  to Canada.41 Similarly,
people may decide not to flee a situation of danger out of
concern for dependents, or because the risk of flight may
seem greater than the risk of staying put, because the cost
of fleeing is too dear, or for a variety of other reasons.
Although matters such as delay in departure, return to the
country of origin, or failure to claim at the first opportunity
may be applied appropriately to the question of objective
risk, none of them necessarily negates a subjective fear of
persecution.
People who may fear the consequences of their actions
nonetheless speak out, write articles, and take political
action in the face of brutal repression as a matter of princi-
ple or conscience. The prisons and torture chambers
around the world are filled with such people. The point is
that people react to danger, and to fear, in a myriad of ways,
and for a wide variety of reasons. Their actions are not
necessarily driven predominantly by fear, even though they
may have great reason to be fearful. Conclusions on what
is in the mind of such people, therefore, should not be made
lightly.
The Law
A. Ward and Rajudeen
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ward is often
cited as the leading authority for the proposition that refugee
claimants are required to establish a subjective fear of per-
secution. Ward, however, contains very little, if any, analysis
of why this is so. As La Forest J. acknowledges, “[I]n the
present case, the only real issue is the objective test.”42 The
issues before the Court in Ward were: persecution and state
complicity; the meaning of “membership in a particular
social group;” the meaning of “political opinion;” the effect
of section 15 of the Charter on the definition of Convention
refugee; and the burden of proof for persons holding dual
nationality.43
In Ward, the Court made brief mention of the fact that
subjective fear is a necessary component of the Convention
refugee definition. The Court simply adopted the test ar-
ticulated and applied by Heald J.A. in Rajudeen.44
Curiously, although Rajudeen has become the standard
authority for the bipartite test, the case is not really about
the bipartite nature of “well-founded fear,” let alone the
subjective component of the test. Rajudeen concerned a Sri
Lankan Tamil who was threatened and beaten by the Sin-
halese “thugs” on a number of occasions. The Sri Lankan
police, meanwhile, turned a blind eye to the communal
violence directed at Tamils.
In Rajudeen, the Immigration Appeal Board determined
the claimant not to be a Convention refugee for the follow-
ing reasons:
Whether events in Sri Lanka can be classed as “civil war” or not,
there is certainly civil unrest but the nature of that unrest and
the resulting harassment of Mr. Rajudeen is not such that he
can be classed as a Convention refugee.45
The primary focus of Heald J.A., in his reasons, was the
meaning of “persecution.” Citing definitions for “perse-
cute” and “persecution” found in The Living Webster Ency-
clopedic Dictionary and The Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary respectively, Justice Heald concluded that
“[b]ased on the evidence of this case, it is clear to me that
this applicant was persecuted over a lengthy period of time
in Sri Lanka because of his religious beliefs as well as his
race.”46
The other issue before the Court in Rajudeen was
whether, in the circumstances, the claimant was required
to avail himself of the protection of the Sri Lankan authori-
ties. On the evidence, the Court held that Mr. Rajudeen had
“ample justification” for being unwilling to do so.47
Heald J.A. concluded his reasons by stating: “I accord-
ingly conclude, that on the basis of all the evidence adduced,
it was possible for the Board to come to only one conclu-
sion, namely, that this applicant had satisfied the definition
of Convention refugee as contained in the Immigration Act,
1976.” The other members of the panel concurred with this
disposition.48
What is curious about the decision in Rajudeen is that
the claimant displayed many of the qualities of an individ-
ual typically found by the IRB to be lacking in subjective
fear. Although being beaten in January, March, April, and
August 1978, Mr. Rajudeen did not leave Sri Lanka until
January 1979.49 He went to India and then Pakistan, but did
not claim asylum. He took a job as a seaman, travelling to
various places in Europe, South America, and Asia over a
period of more than two years. He failed to make a refugee
claim  in any  country  to  which he travelled during this
period.50 In November 1981, while his ship was docked in
Karachi, Pakistan, Mr. Rajudeen made the decision to re-
turn voluntarily to Sri Lanka, believing that “neither India
nor Pakistan accepted refugees.”51 There, he again experi-
enced harassment by the Sinhalese. Nevertheless, he re-
mained in the country until March 1982. He flew to Japan
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where he joined the crew of a Greek ship. He did not claim
asylum in Japan, but when the ship docked in Vancouver,
Mr. Rajudeen finally made a claim to refugee status.52
Mr. Rajudeen had lingered  in  his country  long after
claiming to experience harassment, beatings, and threats,
had failed to make claims in numerous countries when he
had the opportunity to do so, and had returned to Sri Lanka
voluntarily. All of these are factors routinely cited by Boards
in support of findings that claimants are lacking a subjective
fear. Nevertheless, the Federal  Court of Appeal had no
hesitation in finding that this claimant had met the defini-
tion of Convention refugee. It is interesting, then, that this
is the leading judicial authority for the proposition that
subjective  fear is a necessary component of the refugee
definition.
B. Yusuf v. Kamana/Tabet-Zatla
Although consistently accepting that there is a bipartite test
for refugee determination, Canadian courts have not all
been of the view that the two components of the test should
be given equal weight. In Yusuf v. Canada (M.E.I.)53 Mr.
Justice Hugessen, then of the Federal Court of Appeal, ques-
tioned the propriety of rejecting a claim for which there was
an objective basis for the claimant’s fear, on account of a lack
of subjective fear. Wrote Hugessen J.:
It is true, of course, that the definition of a Convention refugee
has always been interpreted as including a subjective and an
objective aspect. The value of this dichotomy lies in the fact that
a person may often subjectively fear persecution while that fear
is not supported by fact, that is, it is objectively groundless.
However, the reverse is much more doubtful. I find it hard to
see in what circumstances it could be said that a person who, we
must not forget, is by definition claiming refugee status could
be right in fearing persecution and still be rejected because it is
said that fear does not actually exist in his conscience. The
definition of a refugee is certainly not designed to exclude brave
or simply stupid persons in favour of those who are more timid
or more intelligent.54
The reasoning  of  Hugessen  J. in Yusuf has not been
universally accepted by the Federal Court. It was followed
in a 2003 decision, Balendra v. Canada (M.C.I.).55 It was also
followed in a 1999 decision, Uthayukumar v. Canada
(M.C.I), where Justice Blais cited the IRB’s Guidelines on
Procedural and Evidentiary Issues for Child Refugee Claim-
ants, which states that “a child claimant may not be able to
express a subjective fear of persecution in the same manner
as an adult claimant.”56
Other decisions have distinguished Yusuf on the basis
that it was decided before the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Ward. This was the case in Maqdassy v. Canada
(M.C.I. ),57 where the applicant, citing Yusuf, submitted that
it may not be necessary to establish a subjective fear of
persecution where it has been clearly shown that an objec-
tive basis for the fear exists. In rejecting this argument,
Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer referred to her earlier
decision in Tabet-Zatla v. Canada (M.C.I.)58 where, citing
her even earlier decision in Kamana, she held that the lack
of evidence going to the subjective element of the claim is
in itself sufficient for the applicant’s claim to fail. In
Kamana v. Canada (M.C.I.), Tremblay-Lamer J. wrote:
The lack of evidence going to the subjective element of the claim
is a fatal flaw which in and of itself warrants dismissal of the
claim, since both elements of the refugee definition – subjective
and objective – must be met.59
A number of other Trial Division decisions have fol-
lowed Kamana and Tabet-Zatla, including Fernando v.
Canada (M.C.I.)60 and Anandasivam v. Canada (M.C.I.),61
two judgments from 2001.
Strictly  speaking, the Kamana/Tabet-Zatla interpreta-
tion of what the Supreme Court said in Ward cannot be
challenged. By definition, under a bipartite test, both parts
of the equation must be established. The potential conse-
quence of this line of reasoning are Yusuf-like decisions,
where a refugee claim is rejected due to a lack of subjective
fear in spite of evidence that establishes an objective ground
for the claimant to be afraid of returning home.
Hathaway has criticized this approach to refugee deter-
mination. He writes:
[I]t would be anomalous to define international legal obliga-
tions in such a way that persons facing the same harm would
receive differential protection. Why should states be expected
to distinguish among persons similarly at risk on the basis of
variations of individual temperament or tolerance? Why should
an individual of stoic disposition be viewed as less worthy of
protection than one who is easily scared, or who proclaims her
concerns with great fervour? Yet surely this is the implication
of giving “substantial, if not primary weight to a claimant’s own
assessment of his or her own situation.”
Logic dictates that since the central issue is whether or not an
individual can safely return to her state, the claimant’s anxiety
level is simply not a relevant consideration.62
Another potential consequence of the reasoning in
Kamana/Tabet-Zatla is that the Board, after finding that the
subjective fear component of the test has not been met,
could simply decide not to examine whether the fear is
Volume 22 Refuge Number 1

objectively well-founded. Indeed, as Justice Lemieux stated
in Anandasivam, “lack of subjective fear constitutes a criti-
cal barrier to a refugee claim which, on its own, justifies non
recognition.”63 If one aspect of the test is not met, what is
the point of examining the other aspect?
One can legitimately question how this interpretation of
the refugee definition can be reconciled with La Forest J’s
statement in Ward that, clearly, “the lynch-pin of the analy-
sis [of the test for determining fear of persecution] is the
state’s inability to protect.”64 Following the reasoning in
Kamana/Tabet-Zatla, persons found lacking in subjective
fear may still be at risk due to their country’s inability, or
unwillingness, to protect. They may still face persecution.
Indeed, how is such an interpretation consistent with one
of the stated objectives  of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, “to recognize that the refugee program is in
the first instance about saving lives and offering protection
to the displaced and persecuted”?65
C. Section 97 of the IRPA
Thrown into this mix is section 97 of the IRPA. Section 95
of the Act states that: “Refugee protection is conferred on a
person when … (b) the Board determines the person to be
a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection."
“Person in need of protection” is defined in section 97 as:
a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries
of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality,
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them
personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of
torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention
Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.
In a number of recent decisions, the Federal Court has
held that there is no subjective component to the test for
determining a person in need of protection. In Shah v.
Canada (M.C.I.) Justice Blanchard noted that the Board
had appeared “to dismiss the claimant’s s. 97 application
based on a finding that the applicant’s behaviour is not
consistent with a well-founded fear of persecution.”66 He
had delayed his departure from Pakistan until one and half
years after incidents of harassment had begun.67 Blanchard
J. decided that:
[e]ven if [he] were to accept this finding as reasonable… the test
under s. 97 of the Act does not require a determination of
subjective fear of persecution, but rather a determination that
removal would subject an applicant to a danger of torture, or to
a risk to life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment under certain conditions.68
Justice Blanchard’s analysis of the test for s. 97 in Shah
has been followed, most recently in the case of Ghasemian
v. Canada (M.C.I.).69 In Bouaouni v. Canada (M.C.I.),70 a
decision that post-dated Shah, the RPD did not believe the
claimant’s testimony that he had been beaten and tortured
by the Tunisian police. On judicial review, Justice
Blanchard discusses the different approaches to claims
made under sections 96 (regarding Convention refugees)
and 97 of the Act. Discussing how the Board should address
claims under s. 97 of the IRPA, he states:
There may well be instances where a refugee claimant, whose
identity is not disputed, is found to be not credible with respect
to his subjective fear of persecution, but the country conditions
are such that the claimant’s particular circumstances, make
him/her a person in need of protection. It follows that a negative
credibility determination, which may be determinative of a
refugee claim under s. 96 of the Act, is not necessarily determi-
native of a  claim  under subsection 97 (1) of the Act.  The
elements required to establish a claim under section 97 differ
from those required under section 96 of the Act where a well-
founded fear of persecution to a Convention ground must be
established. Although the evidentiary basis may well be the same
for both claims, it is essential that both claims be considered as
separate. A claim under section 97 of the Act requires that the
Board apply a different test, namely whether a claimant’s re-
moval would subject him personally to the dangers and risks
stipulated in paragraphs 97 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act.71
The IRPA is a relatively new piece of legislation, and
many more decisions on the evaluation of section 97 claims
are to be expected. Still, in light of this jurisprudence, one
can arguably say that a double standard exists for applicants
before the Board. Those who face a risk to life, torture, or
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment need not es-
tablish that they subjectively fear such treatment. Those
who face other forms of persecution (for example, arbitrary
detention, denial of the right to work and other forms of
systematic discrimination, harassment, or physical treat-
ment that does not amount to torture or cannot be consid-
ered “cruel and unusual”) will have to establish subjective
fear.
To illustrate the point, here is an example. Imagine that
both claimants A and B have objectively well-founded rea-
sons for not returning to their respective countries of ori-
gin. Claimant A will likely be sent to prison for years
because of his political writings. Claimant B, who is charged
with theft, will likely be deprived of food and sleep, and held
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incommunicado for several months, because that is how
persons charged with criminal offences are routinely
treated in his country. Both claimants came to Canada via
the Netherlands, but neither claimed asylum there. Both
waited two weeks before initiating their claims in Canada.
Claimant A, having to deal with the bipartite test under
section 96 of the IRPA, may have his claim turned down
due to a lack of subjective fear. In claimant B’s case, under
section 97, subjective fear will not even be an issue.
It is hard to discern any justification for requiring some
claimants to meet a bipartite test of well-founded fear, but
not others. All are seeking the same thing, protection from
persecution. The only factors that distinguish claims made
under section 96 and 97 are the necessity for the former to
be based on one or more of the grounds enumerated in the
Convention, and the limited form of persecution contem-
plated by section 97. As Blanchard J. suggests in Bouaouni,
in many cases, the evidentiary base for both claims will be
the same. Why then, with respect to the question of subjec-
tive fear, should some claims be treated differently than
others?
Conclusion
It is perhaps an ideal time for Canadian decision makers to
reconsider the appropriateness of the bipartite test for de-
termining well-founded fear of persecution. The historical
basis for the bipartite test has, for some years, been seriously
questioned by academics. The equal division of weight be-
tween the subjective and objective components of the test
continues to be challenged by some members of the judici-
ary. Moreover, given the current state of psychological re-
search into Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, one can
confidently say now that many potential pitfalls exist for
board members in determining whether subjective fear ac-
tually exists in the minds of claimants. Finally, due to the
introduction of the category of “person in need of protec-
tion,” there are now two standards of review for claimants,
with no clear, logical reason for this to be so. Adopting a test
that requires more attention to the objective nature of risk
facing refugee claimants, and less on what may be going on
in their minds, would place emphasis, quite properly in our
view, on the need for protection.
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